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Concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar
Abstract
This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in
Wittgenstein's last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings.
It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and
factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving
around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar'. I explain why
Wittgenstein's account does not fall prey to Davidson's animadversions against the idea of a conceptual
scheme as a force operating on a pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction
between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears in the last writings: it is neither deliberately
abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions in On Certainty or by the
















conceptual   scheme.  Section  4  explains  why Wittgenstein’s  account  does  not   fall   prey   to 
Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a 
pre­conceptual  content.   In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and 





the  Tractatus  and family­resemblance concepts  in the  Investigations—than about concepts 
simpliciter. While there are theories of concepts inspired by Wittgenstein, there have not been 
sustained   interpretations  of  his  own views  concerning   the  nature  of  concepts.  There   is  a 
2straightforward excuse for this failure, namely that these views are hard to pinpoint. But there 
are two notable exceptions. The first is material from the early 1930s, in particular dictations 










Certainty  in isolation from other material  of  that period,  such as  Remarks on Colour  and 
Zettel. For another, I am not claiming that semantic ideas hold the key to these later writings. 
What   I   am   claiming   is   that   they   contain   semantic   ideas  which   are   important   both   for 
exegetical and for substantive reasons.
Let me mention one general exegetical moral that can be drawn from this material. 




this   hypothesis   about  Wittgenstein’s   intellectual   development.   Rather   than   being   more 
therapeutic or woolly, they tend to be more constructive and straightforward than some earlier 
remarks.   This   goes   even   for   the   occasional   hesitations   and   qualifications.   Indeed, 
Wittgenstein  comes closest   to  being  therapeutic  when he  throws caution  to   the wind and 
propounds provocative claims designed to jerk us out of our intellectual complacency. A case 








To appreciate   the  substantive   importance  of  our   topic,   let  us   look at   some claims  about 
concepts that one can garner from Wittgenstein’s later oeuvre:
(I)   There   is   a   difference   between   philosophical   problems   and   investigations,  which   are 
conceptual, and those of empirical science, which are factual.
(II)  Concepts  can  be  analysed,  namely   through  analysing   the  “application”  of  words   (PI 




Rather,   they   result   from   linguistic   rules   that   exclude   a   sentence   like   “This   object   is 
simultaneously red and green all over” as nonsensical. For this reason, a phenomenological 
analysis of the kind sought by Goethe and Husserl must turn out to be a “conceptual analysis” 
(RC   II   §16).   As   part   of   such   analysis   we   compare   and   contrast   (establish   analogies, 



















concern the connection  between concepts,  conceptual  schemes and grammatical  rules,   i.e. 
claims   I,   III,   IV   and  V.2  But  while   I   specifically  discuss  whether  Wittgenstein   came   to 
abandon the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions, I do not beleive that 
these writings constitute a general  break with the  Investigations, by contrast to the genuine 
break   separating   the  Tractatus  from   the   work   after   1929     (see   Glock   2007a,   43­6). 
Consequently I shall also draw on earlier material where appropriate. 
3. Conceptual Investigations, Metaphysics and Grammar
According   to  Zettel  §458,   “philosophical   investigations”   are   “conceptual”   rather   than 
“factual”   (sachlich).   Conversely,   it   is   constitutive   of   ‘metaphysics’—i.e.   misguided 
philosophy—that it confuses factual and conceptual investigations. Metaphysics purports to 






attempts  to capture rather  than to revise our actual ways of thinking,   it  consists of (often 
distorted) ‘grammatical propositions’, propositions that express rules for the use or words, but 
in the disguise of factual propositions (see BB 18, 35; AWL 18, 65­9; WVC 67).


























that   this   is   at   any   rate   a  possibility.  Even   in   that   case,  we  would  not   cease   to   call   the 
appearance of the footprints an event. A physical change would be an event, even if a causal 
explanation of it could be ruled out ab initio. Nor does the possibility of an uncaused event 
arise   exclusively  out  of  a   change   to   the  concept  of  an  event  brought   about  by  quantum 
mechanics. Even in the eigteenth century, being caused was  not  part of the  explanation  of 
what an event is, and any physical change would have  counted as an event, irrespective of 
whether   a   cause   for   it   is   in   the   offing   (this   is  why   both  Hume   and  Kant,   substantive 
differences notwithstanding, regarded (2) as synthetic). In short, being caused is not part of 
our explanation of the term “event”, or of the linguistic rules governing its use. At the same 





contemporaries   call   a   conceptual   scheme.   According   to   Quine   (1981,   41)   the   term 
“conceptual   scheme”   derives   from  Pareto.  Quine   himself   has   used   it   intermittently.   For 
example,  he speaks  of   the  “conceptual   scheme of   science  as  a   tool   for  predicting   future 
experience”   (1953,  42;   see  also  1969,  1,  24).   In  a   similar  vein,  Strawson describes  “our 
conceptual scheme”, as “the way we think of the world”, and he sets descriptive metaphysics 
the task of elucidating “the actual structure of our thought about the world” (1959, 15, 9). In 
the   wake   of   Quine   and   Strawson,   numerous   philosophers   have   employed   the   terms 
“conceptual scheme” and “conceptual framework” to refer to the web of fundamental notions 
and principles which it is the business of philosophy to investigate or articulate.
The   proximity   of   this   conceptual   scheme/empirical   content   distinction   to 
Wittgenstein’s position is even more striking when we consider claim V from our list above.
“The   limits   of   the   empirical—is  concept­formation”   (RFM 237).  A  mathematical   proof, 






dichotomy   between   conceptual   scheme   and   empirical   content   as   a   ‘third   dogma   of 
empiricism’,   to   be   consigned   to   the   dustbin   of   history   along   with   the   dogmas   of   the 
analytic/synthetic distinction and of reductionism allegedly unmasked by Quine. Elsewhere 
(1996b)   I  have  argued  that  Wittgenstein’s  distinction  between grammatical  and  empirical 
propositions does not fall prey to Quine’s attacks, but helps to undermine the latter’s position. 
In  this  essay I  shall  only  tackle  a  sui  generis  Davidsonian criticism of  the more specific 
distinction between conceptual framework and empirical content.














universes.  Some  sentences  will  be   true   simply  because  of   the  concepts  or  meanings 
involved, others because of the way of the world. In describing possible worlds, we play 
with sentences of the second kind only (1984, 187).
Davidson  repudiates   this  version  on   the  grounds   that   the   analytic­synthetic  distinction   is 

















his  animosity   towards   the   internal  scheme/content  distinction.  That   internal  version  gives 
sense   to   the   notion   of   a   conceptual   scheme   without   invoking   mentalist   metaphors, 







distinction.  By   contrast   to  Kant,  Wittgenstein   does   not   postulate   an   organising   psychic 
mechanism—the  understanding—which   imposes  order  on  a   chaotic  pre­conceptual   input. 
Instead, Wittgenstein’s distinction between conceptual scheme and experience operates at a 
linguistic level, as he makes clear in  Remarks on Colour: “For it is not after all a psychic 










anticipates  On   Certainty.   Nevertheless  several   commentators  have  indicated  that 












can imagine circumstances  in which certain  sentences  turn from grammatical  propositions 
into moves of the language­game. Finally, according to §§318­9, “there is no sharp boundary” 
“between   methodological   propositions   and   propositions   within   a   method”   or   “between 
propositions of logic and empirical propositions”.
On the other hand, Wittgenstein immediately adds that this “lack of sharpness is that 
of   the  boundary  between  rule  and empirical  proposition”  and  is  due   to   the   fact   that   the 
concept of a proposition is itself vague (§320). But that a boundary or division is not “sharp” 
does not mean that it is spurious or unworkable. Moreover, the first two potential grounds are 


















difference   between   empirical   propositions   and   “logical”   descriptions   of   the   “conceptual 





















not   exhaustive  Rather   than   reducing   the   types   of   propositions   to  one,   as   the   empiricist 
assimilation would have it, Wittgenstein expands them to three.









logic”   is  Wittgenstein’s   preferred   terminology   for   grammatical   propositions   in   his   last 
writings   (e.g.  OC §§56­7,  68,  447,  628)  this  commits  him  to  distinguishing  between   the 



































































regarded as necessary (analytic,  a priori,  conceptual,  etc.)  are now regarded as empirical, 




Wittgenstein’s   last  writings   are   particularly   alive   to   various   kinds   of   conceptual 
diversity   and   change.  He   rightly   takes   for   granted   that   concepts  can  be   shared  between 
different subjects.6 At the same time he is interested in conceptual variance and change—not 
just across different forms of life (a major theme in  On Certainty), but also  within  a single 
linguistic community. Thus Remarks on Colour points out that different speakers of the same 
language can have  somewhat  different, e.g. more or less refined, colour concepts, and that 




















as   grammatical   or   semantically   constitutive.  They   are   foundations  of   “our   thinking   (our 
language)”,   to be sure;  yet  only in  the sense that  error or doubt about   them removes the 
14
framework  for   operating  with   certain   terms   or   employing   certain   concepts.   This   is   an 
important  point.  But it  does not cast  doubt on the possibility  of distinguishing between a 
sentence having a grammatical (normative) and its having an empirical (descriptive) role in a 






not   an  expression  makes   sense  need  not,   and   indeed   cannot,   be   entirely   independent   of 
contingent matters of fact. Nor can it be independent of speakers  knowing those facts with 
which they need to be acquainted in order to be able to use the expression in a rule­governed 











































however,   no   hinge   proposition   is   specified   either   in   §494   or   its   surroundings.   So   the 
proposition the status of which is being pondered is not a hinge proposition. Nor can it be the 
sentence quoted at the outset, since for lack of anaphoric reference of “this proposition” we 




Unlike  the hinge propositions  to which it  alludes,   (10) can be regarded as a  (non­trivial) 
grammatical remark, and within a philosophical debate such grammatical reminders can have 
the force of invoking a rule (see Glock 1991).
Keeping   the   trichotomy   grammatical/empirical/framework   in   mind   also   helps   to 











logic   if   the   rules   of   measurement   included   the   results   of   particular   measurements. 
Wittgenstein specifically denies this, and he is obviously right. Now consider the statement











The  following passage  varies   the   theme of  agreement   in  an   interestingly  different 
direction.  
We say: human beings, in order to communicate, must agree with one another about the 














holds is  a  criterion for members of a linguistic community agreeing on the meaning of  e, 








truth in   the apparently  contrary proposals  discussed,  respectively in  the last   two sections, 
namely that hinge propositions are grammatical rather than empirical and that they undermine 






and between understanding  and knowledge disappears.  One  can  meaningfully  but   falsely 
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8  Baker  and  Hacker   (1985,  256­8)  note  an   apparent   inconsistency   in   this  passage,  namely  between   the   idea   that   the 
agreement required for communication is “not an agreement in opinion but in form of life” and insisting that there must be 
agreement in judgements. There are two ways of rendering the passage consistent: either by reading the former sentence as 
allowing that “agreement in form of life” includes yet is not exhausted by agreement in opinions/judgements or by imputing 
to Wittgenstein a distinction between opinions on the one hand and judgements on the other. There is support for both 
options, and no need to decide the matter in the current context.
